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Topological Fidelity in Sensor Networks
Harish Chintakunta and Hamid Krim
Abstract
Sensor Networks are inherently complex networks, and many of
their associated problems require analysis of some of their global char-
acteristics. These are primarily affected by the topology of the net-
work. We present in this paper, a general framework for a topological
analysis of a network, and develop distributed algorithms in a gen-
eralized combinatorial setting in order to solve two seemingly unre-
lated problems, 1) Coverage hole detection and Localization and 2)
Worm hole attack detection and Localization. We also note these
solutions remain coordinate free as no priori localization information
of the nodes is assumed. For the coverage hole problem, we follow
a “divide and conquer approach”, by strategically dissecting the net-
work so that the overall topology is preserved, while efficiently pursu-
ing the detection and localization of failures. The detection of holes,
is enabled by first attributing a combinatorial object called a ”Rips
Complex” to each network segment, and by subsequently checking the
existence/non-existence of holes by way of triviality of the first homol-
ogy class of this complex. Our estimate exponentially approaches the
location of potential holes with each iteration, yielding a very fast
convergence coupled with optimal usage of valuable resources such as
power and memory. We then show a simple extension of the above
problem to address a well known problem in networks, namely the
localization of a worm hole attack. We demonstrate the effectiveness
of the presented algorithm with several substantiating examples.
1 Introduction
The infrastructure of computing systems is rapidly transitioning from cen-
tralized systems to distributed and pervasive systems. A very important
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class of such systems are sensor networks which find applications in areas in-
cluding Environmental monitoring, Health care and Military operations [1].
There has been a considerable research interest in this field over the past
decade, addressing problems including node localization [5], distributed com-
pression [20], probabilistic inference [34] and motion tracking. A unifying
theme of many of these problems is to glean consensus information by sys-
tematically combining the data collected at individual nodes, in accordance
to the structure of the network. The consensus information thus obtained
characterizes the network, or the data in the network as a whole, and bet-
ter represents the underlying phenomenon which can be inferred from the
data at individual nodes. This reveals the fundamental nature of sensor net-
works: they are essentially complex networks in which global patterns emerge
from simple interactions between nodes. From an engineering perspective,
the fundamental challenge in sensor network applications is to cope with the
limited resources; a limited communication capability of nodes, i.e. nodes can
only communicate with their neighbors, with a limited power and a limited
memory. Furthermore, sensor networks are often deployed in unaccessible
locations and environments where maintenance is impractical; this makes
careful use of exhaustible resources such as power, imperative.
This unique set of circumstances motivates the use of techniques such as
topological analysis. This is to directly extract global information without
being overly dependent on the local structure, and thereby alleviating the
excessive need for recourses. We demonstrate in this paper, the merits of
such analysis by exploiting tools to solve two specific important problems:
1)A Coverage Hole detection and localization and 2)A Worm-Hole Attack
detection and localization.
The first Problem discussed in Section 4 seeks to identify an area within
a network which is not in the range (and hence uncovered) of any sensor.
The second problem investigates the detection and localization of an attack
called a worm-hole. This has a potential of substantially disrupting routing,
localization and other tasks in a network. In the next section, we endeavor
to briefly summarize the research in topological analysis and work related to
the techniques presented in this paper.
1.1 Topological Analysis in Sensor Networks
Distributed algorithms for analyzing topological properties may be broadly
classified into three categories: Geometric, Topological, and Statistical Meth-
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ods. This categorization is based on the taxonomy presented in [32], and a
good overview of algorithms in these areas is presented in [11].
Topology may be described as the study of arrangement of spaces (manifolds
or other data spaces) whereas Geometry may be described as the study of
metrics (measures of distance) on these spaces. This distinction characterizes
the difference between distributed algorithms using topological and geomet-
ric methods. In sensor networks, the space of interest is first constructed
using the node parameters followed by an analysis methodology of choice
(For example, in the coverage problem in Section 4, the space of interest is
the total coverage area). We may also view the Geometric methods as a
“fine”analysis of spaces whereas Topological methods as a “coarse” analysis.
Statistical methods rely on the aggregate statistical behavior of node param-
eters and try to infer the necessary information of the network by tracing
the changes in these statistics. Our present work falls into the category of a
Topological approach. The distinction of these methods can be instantiated
by looking at existing algorithms to solve the coverage problem.
In geometric methods, for example, the work in [11] computes an α-hull of
the node positions in order to identify the outer and inner (coverage-hole)
boundaries of a network. An α-hull of a set of points V in a plane is given by
the intersection of complementary regions of circles of radius 1/α, such that
no point in V lies inside these circles. The complement of a circle is defined
as the entire plane excluding the interior of this circle. Some other geometric
methods for the coverage problem are presented in [10] and [11].
An example of a statistical approach for a coverage problem may be found
in [28]. It relies on the idea that nodes close to network boundaries, have
fewer incident edges in the network graph than internal nodes. The authors
use statistical methods to derive suitable thresholds to separate edge nodes
from internal nodes using the node degrees. In [29], boundary nodes are
separated from internal nodes by using a centrality measure which counts
the number of shortest paths that pass through a node. A higher centrality
value occurs among internal nodes.
In the Topological methodology, Morse theory and Algebraic Topology are
the most commonly used tools.
1.1.1 Morse Theoretic Methods
Morse theoretic methods analyze the topology of a given topological space,
more specifically a manifold, by studying differentiable functions defined on
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Figure 1: A high level schematic of Algebraic Topology
it. Consider a differentiable function f : M → R defined on a manifold M ,
then the inverse image of a point in R is called a level set. A principal tenet
underlying these methods is the observation that critical points of this func-
tion, where topology of the level sets changes, directly reflect the underlying
topological construction of the space.
For the coverage problem, an example of a Morse theoretic topological method
is given in [12]. The authors find boundaries of a network by studying the
behavior of connected components, the nodes of which are at equi-hop dis-
tance from a randomly selected point in the network. The main observation
here is that each of these components has a discontinuity at the boundaries
of the network.
Morse theoretic methods often provide simple and efficient (in complex-
ity) methods to analyze the underlying topology, but the greatest challenge
of these methods is often the construction of an appropriate function. In ad-
dition, since the theory is mostly developed for manifolds, it requires stricter
assumptions for discrete spaces such as positions of nodes in a network. For
example, the work presented in [12] will fail to provide reasonable results if
the node density is small, or their distribution is non-uniform.
1.1.2 An Algebraic Topological Approach
Algebraic topology, in contrast to a Morse theory, is a relatively more direct
technique to analyze the topology of a space which is easily expressed in
terms of algebraic objects. There is an extensive literature in Algebraic
topology [16,31] which shows a very strong relationship between topological
spaces and their algebraic counterparts. This also enables us to draw from
an extensive source of knowledge in algebra to develop fast and efficient
algorithms. The algebraic objects of choice have the following important
properties: They directly reflect the topological features of an underlying
space, and they are invariant to continuous deformations. We therefore follow
this approach in our work owing to these advantages.
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The use of algebraic topology for the coverage problem mentioned above,
was first introduced in [9, 13]. The works in [22, 23] propose a distributed
computation of homology groups, and [30] attempts to localize the holes by
formulating localization as an optimization problem. We further exploit the
natural spatial constraint of the coverage holes, to formulate a new effective
and efficient ”divide and conquer” algorithm. To the best of our knowledge,
[30] is the first attempt at distributively localizing holes using an algebraic
topological approach and we compare our work on coverage holes with the
results presented in there. A preliminary version of this paper was presented
in [7].
A hole may be caused by a) deployment error, b) some catastrophic event
such as an explosion, c) presence of a jammer which disables associated nodes’
communication, and thereby hiding their presence within the network. In
case of deployment error, a hole localization helps in targeted redeployment,
and more generally, helps in precisely identifying the location of the cause
of failure events. Routing algorithms such as geographic-routing [27] and
some other distributed signal processing algorithms heavily depend on certain
assumptions about the topology of the network of interest [35]. Having this
knowledge of the overall topology may therefore be very useful.
Other network failures, which may have a devastating impact, include worm
holes. A worm hole attack is typically launched by two colluding external
attackers who do not authenticate themselves as legitimate nodes to the
network. When initiating a wormhole attack, an attacker overhears packets
in one part of the network, tunnels them through the wormhole link (external
to the network) to another part of the network. This effectively generates a
false scenario of the presence of the original sender in the neighborhood of
the remote location. An illustration of a worm-hole is given in Figure ??.
Many routing algorithms depend on the nodes’ ability to accurately dis-
cover their neighboring nodes. The nodes ordinarily perform a broadcasting
beacons (including ID, and other information) to their neighbors. If the
neighbor discovery beacons are tunneled through wormholes, the good nodes
will get false information about their route. Although finding faulty routes
is in itself a problem, worm holes can cause further critical security threats
using these faulty routes. The resulting effect of wormholes on the routing
is to include a worm hole link in most of the computed routes. This in turn,
gives an attacker complete control of transmitting great amounts of data,
which may be selectively or completely dropped. Impacts of a wormhole on
a route discovery procedure in a sensor network have been studied at length
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in [17, 19].
In the absence of known coordinates, as that provided for example by
GPS, nodes in a sensor network depend on the positions of their neighbors to
triangulate their own positions. A limited deployment of a hardware (GPS)
over a few nodes would, on the other hand, be sufficient for the entirety of the
nodes to compute their positions. Much work has been done on distributed
localization in sensor networks [8, 21], and the predominant approach relies
on strong correlation of geographic vicinity and communication capability
of the nodes. Note that wormholes distort such correlation, and will hence
adversely affect the localization algorithms. A study of impact of wormholes
on localization procedures can be found in [19]. In light of the serious impact
worm holes may have on a sensor network, we propose to also naturally adapt
the strategy we proposed for analyzing coverage problem to not only detect
but also localize these failures.
1.2 Paper Organization
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formalize
both the coverage hole and the worm hole problem by a precise mathematical
formulation. We subsequently provide the fundamental mathematical back-
ground necessary for topological analysis in Section 3. We provide a detailed
discussion of our algorithm to localize the Coverage Hole in Section 4, and
describe its natural adaptation to the problem of the worm hole attack in
Section 5. We conclude with some remarks in Section 6.
2 Formalization of topological network failures
2.1 Coverage Problem
We consider the scenario where N sensor nodes are randomly deployed in
a region of interest. We denote the collection of all the nodes as the set
V = {vi}. Each node vi can communicate with all the nodes within a circu-
lar neighborhood Ric of radius r
i
c, and we denote these nodes as the set N(vi),
the neighbors of vi. A communication graph G = (V,E) is thus formed as
the collection of the set V together with the set of edges E = {(vi, vj)} where
(vi, vj) ∈ E, if and only if vi, vj can communicate with each other. The cov-
erage area of a sensor at each node is assumed to be a circular neighborhood
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Ris or radius rs centered at the node vi. Let ℜ denote the union of areas en-
closed by the outermost boundaries of connected components of the network.
The objective is to ensure that the following relation holds
ℜ ⊆
⋃
i
Ric = Rc, (1)
where Rc is the total coverage space. This also highlights our interest in ℜ
being completely covered by the coverage areas of the sensors. The outermost
boundary of a sensor network is to some extent in the control of the deployer,
and there are algorithms which can detect this boundary [33]. As Equation
(1) suggests, we are therefore mainly interested in the coverage of the region
”inside” the network. Furthermore, if the relation (1) does not hold, our
goal is to find the nodes which are closest to the boundary ∂(ℜ \Rc) of the
uncovered region. As an illustration of this problem, Figure 11(a) shows a
network with its communication graph and coverage area (the shaded re-
gion). The region of interest is the interior of the outermost boundary of the
network. Since a part of this region is not covered by any sensor, we seek
the smallest cycle in the network surrounding this coverage hole. We assume
the following:
1. Let Q be a clique in G, then
conv(Q) ⊆
⋃
vi∈Q
Ric, (2)
i.e., for any given clique Q in the communication graph, the convex hull
(conv(Q)) of the nodes is completely covered. This assumption serves
to characterize the coverage area using the communication graph, as
further discussed in Section 3. This can be ensured by requiring the
relationship between the sensor coverage radius and the communication
radius as rs ≥ rc√3 . Note that this assumption is not restrictive as the
antenna power and hence the communication radius, may be altered
in order to extract the appropriate graph. This may be seen in Figure
11(a), where for any clique (for example, all the triangles), the interior
is completely covered.
2. The nodes have no localization information.
3. There is no direction information, i.e., the nodes are unaware of the
relative orientation of their neighbors.
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4. The nodes are not necessarily uniformly distributed in a given region
of interest.
2.2 Worm Hole Problem
A worm-hole attack is typically launched by two colluding nodes at positions
p1 and p2 inside a network. Denote the neighborhood regions around these
points by N1 and N2. The two attacking nodes may receive all the packets
transmitted from within their respective neighborhoods, and relay them to
the other. Denote by V1 and V2 the sets of vertices (sensor nodes) which lie in
N1 and N2 respectively. The result of a worm-hole attack will be to produce
a complete bi-partite graph with V1 and V2 as the two classes of vertices.
The problem of localizing a worm hole attack, hence reduces to identifying
the sets V1 and V2. In addition to all the above assumptions pertaining to
the coverage problem, we will also assume the following:
1. The positions p1 and p2 are sufficiently far apart from each other inside
the network. This assumption is based on expected topology change
due to a wormhole and assumed detectability (this is possible only if
N1 ∩N2 = φ).
2. The positions p1 and p2 are not very close to the outer boundary of the
network.
3. The distribution of the nodes is sufficiently dense such that a deletion
of a node in the network will not cause a significant change in the path
lengths. This assumption is not necessary for detecting a worm hole,
but is important for localizing the neighborhoods N1 and N2.
Figure ?? shows an example of a worm hole attack. In this case, X and
Y are the positions p1 and p2 and the neighborhoods A and B are N1 and N2
according to our definition. Note that in the network shown, N1 ∩ N2 = φ,
which will enable us to detect the attack. The assumptions 2 and 3 are
however, not valid as p1 and p2 are close to the outermost boundary which
violates assumption 2, and there is a bottleneck in the network which violates
assumption 3. The algorithm presented in Section 5 will cause some false
alarms in this case. We further elaborate on this in Section 5, and show
some examples where we can accurately localize the attack.
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3 Framework
The current state of research invokes areas from Mathematics such as Topol-
ogy, Homological Algebra, Engineering and Computer science (eg. gossip al-
gorithms in Sensor networks and Graph theory). In this section, we construct
a suitable framework for our algorithm, by introducing the necessary mathe-
matical and computational tools. While the available literature is extensive,
we focus only on the important concepts which are central and sufficient to
elucidate the implications of our algorithm.
3.1 Topological Analysis
Topological analysis [25] can loosely be construed as the study of global or-
ganization of spaces without paying much heed to fine geometrical structure.
For a space embedded in R3, this amounts to analyzing properties such as,
“is the space connected?”, “does the space wrap upon itself?”, “does the
surface have any holes?” or “does the surface enclose a three dimensional
void?” and so on. As such, the developed tools provide the proper gener-
alization to study organizational features of a network, without expending
resources on finer details. This generality is concisely captured in the notions
of homotopic mappings and homotopy equivalent spaces, which are defined
as follows:
Definition Let X and Y be two spaces. Two maps f1, f2 : X → Y are said
to be homotopic (f1 ≈ f2) to each other if ∃ a continuous map F : X×I →
Y (where I = [0, 1]) such that F (s, 0) = f1(s) and F (s, 1) = f2(s). Such a
function F is called a Homotopy between f1 and f2.
Definition Two spaces X and Y are said to be Homotopy Equivalent if
∃ continuous maps f : X → Y and g : Y → X such that f ◦ g ≈ id and
g ◦ f ≈ id. Such a map f is called a homotopy equivalence.
The above definition means that if two spaces X and Y are homotopy
equivalent, then one can be continuously deformed into the other, and they
both have the same topological features. A remarkable result from algebraic
topology is that the homology spaces which we compute (described in Section
3.3), are invariant to homotopic mappings. This is what enables us to treat a
relatively large class of spaces in a unified framework without the costly and
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valuable resources required for considering their exact geometry. The compu-
tation of homology spaces does not depend on the localization information of
nodes. Figure 2 shows two homotopy equivalent spaces which may be viewed
as coverage areas of two different sensor network. Although, their geome-
try (the distribution of distances between points) is quite different (this also
reflects the location of the nodes), they have the same topological features.
We can further exploit this invariance to get homotopy equivalent represen-
Figure 2: Figure showing two homotopy equivalent spaces
tations of these spaces, using simple building blocks which, as will be seen,
are simple to manipulate. These representations are called simplicial com-
plexes. The simple building blocks are called simplices (simple pieces). The
dimension of a simplex is represented by its order. Simplicial Complexes are
representations of given topological spaces using simplices (simple pieces). A
standard 0-simplex is just a point, a standard 1-simplex is a line segment, a
2-simplex a triangle and so on. A kth order simplex or k-simplex σk is the set
of all points given by the convex combination of k + 1 linearly-independent
points, σk = (v0, ...vk). Figure 3 shows simplices of order 0 through 3, and
Figure 4 shows an example of representing a topological space using a simpli-
cial complex. Note that the topology is preserved in the simplicial complex
representation.
3.2 Combinatrics
Owing to its simple representation, a simplicial complex may be abstracted
into a combinatorial object. We can view this intermediate step as a tran-
sition from topological spaces into algebra for computing homology spaces.
As each simplex is uniquely determined by specifying its vertices, given the
total set of vertices V = {vi}, a simplicial complex may then be abstractly
specified as a collection of subsets Ej ⊂ P (V ), j = 1, 2, . . ., where P (V ) is the
power set, and each Ej is a collection of j−tuples from V representing the
j−1 simplices. Note that when we restrict j to the set {1, 2}, what we get is
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(a) 0-Simplex (b) 1-Simplex (c) 2-Simplex
(d) 3-Simplex
Figure 3: Simplices of order 1 to 4
a graph. Therefore, a simplicial complex may be viewed as a generalization
of a graph, and when it is homotopy equivalent to a space, it captures its
topological properties. For a given k simplex (v0, . . . , vk), we can also define
an orientation by specifying the order of the vertices. We divide all possible
permutations of these k+1 points into two classes, the elements of each class
may be transformed from one to another by interchanging adjacent vertices
an even number of times, giving a simplex two possible orientations. The
simplices in Figures 3 and 4 show an orientation given to the simplices.
To get a representation of a coverage area, we can use a particular type of
a simplicial complex called the nerve complex [14]. Note that the coverage
area is a union of convex sets. Given a collection of sets Rc =
⋃
iR
i
c , the
nerve complex (or the cˆech complex) of Rc, KN (Rc), is the abstract simpli-
cial complex whose k-simplices correspond to nonempty intersections of k+1
distinct elements of Rc. An edge in KN (Rc) exists between two vertices if
and only if the corresponding elements of Rc intersect. Higher dimensional
simplices are regulated by mutual intersections of collections of elements of
Rc. Among the many uses of nerves in topology, the following classical result
is perhaps of greater importance in applications:
Theorem 3.1 (The Cˆech Theorem): The nerve complex of a collection of
convex sets has the homotopy type of the union of the sets.
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(a) A topological space
(b) Simplicial Complex representing the topo-
logical space
Figure 4: Representation of a Topological space using a simplicial complex
The implication of this theorem is thatKN (Rc) effectively captures the topol-
ogy of Rc. The computation of the nerve complex unfortunately requires
localization information, and is very difficult even when we have it. We
therefore rely on an approximate representation called the Vietoris-Rips (or
Rips in short) complex, denoted by Kp (Rc) which can be obtained from only
the communication graph. For extracting the Rips complex, we simply say
that each k clique in the communication graph is a k − 1 simplex in the
Rips Complex. Under assumption (1) in Section 2.1, the Rips complex is
a reasonable approximation of the underlying topological space in the sense
that the number of false alarms and false negatives indicating coverage holes
are very low in number. The reader is refered to [13] for examples where the
Rips complex does not accurately represent the coverage area. We however
maintain that this is not a limitation and as shown in [14], we can always
represent Rc accurately using two Rips complexes using appropriate radius
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of communications. In particular, for a coverage radius rc, the authors show
that, if we have communication radii (strong and weak) r1 and r2 such that
2rc = r1 ≥
√
2r2, then the rips complexes K
r1
p (Rc) and K
r2
p (Rc) satisfy the
following relation:
Kr2p (Rc) ⊂ KN (Rc) ⊂ Kr1p (Rc) (3)
The above relation implies that the topology of Rc is completely captured by
the two rips complexes. This is tantamount to using our algorithm twice. For
the purpose of this paper, we will assume that the Rips complex obtained
with condition (1) in Section 2.1 accurately represents the Coverage area.
We will describe in the following section, an approach to infer the topological
properties of Rc using Algebra on Kp (Rc).
3.3 Homological Algebra
In this section, we discuss some fundamental notions of homology spaces. We
subsequently relate the algebraic structure to the combinatorial structure of
the Rips Complex, and demonstrate the usefulness of these spaces in inferring
the existence and the cardinality of coverage holes.
Definition A Chain Complex {Ck, ∂k} is a sequence of vector spaces
{Ck} together with linear operators {∂k : Ck → Ck−1} called the boundary
operators,
→ Cn ∂n→ Cn−1 ∂n−1→ · · · ∂k+1→ Ck ∂k→ Ck−1 · · · ∂1→ C0 → 0
with the boundary operators satisfying
∂k−1 ◦ ∂k = 0 or ∂2 = 0 (4)
The groups {Ck} are called chain spaces and their elements are called
chains .
The chain complex is fundamental to homological algebra, as it provides the
structure where homology spaces may be defined. Note that since ∂k−1◦∂k =
0, it follows that the image of one boundary operator is a subset of the kernel
(or null space) of the next boundary operator, i.e.,
Img(∂k) ⊂ Ker(∂k−1)
This observation enables us to define a homology space as follows,
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Definition Given a chain complex C = {Ck, ∂k}, the kth homology group
Hk(C) of the chain complex is given as
Hk(C) = ker(∂k)/Img(∂k+1) (5)
i.e., the kth homology group is the quotient group formed by equivalent classes
of elements in ker (∂k), where the elements are considered equivalent if their
difference lies in the subspace Img (∂k+1).
Of particular interest to us, is the first homology space H1(C). We will
hence work only with C2, C1 and C0. We form the chain spaces C2, C1 and
C0 by taking all the 2-simplices (triangles), 1-simplices (edges) and vertices
respectively of the Rips Complex Kp (Rc) as the basis vectors. The additive
inverses in the chain spaces are given in terms of the orientation as:
if σk = (v0, . . . , vi, vi+1, . . . , vk) then − σk = (v0, . . . , vi+1, vi, . . . , vk) (6)
and the boundary operator is defined in terms of k-dimensional simplices as:
∂k(v0, . . . , vk) =
∑
i
−1i(v0, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vk) (7)
It is simple to check that the boundary operator so defined satisfies Equation
(4), and we show this fact here by considering, for example, the action of
∂1 ◦ ∂2 on a two simplex (v0, v1, v2).
∂1◦∂2(v0, v1, v2) = ∂1((v1, v2)−(v0, v2)+(v0, v1)). = v2−v1−v2+v0+v1−v0 = 0
(8)
Using the above definitions of boundary operators and chain spaces, we can
form a chain complex C (Rc) using the combinatorial structure in the Rips
Complex.
In order to understand what homology groups tell us about the topological
space, we should carefully look at the action of the boundary operators. Let
us look at the null space (kernel) of ∂1. Consider a cycle c = e1+ e2+ e3+ e3
as shown in Figure (5) which is homotopic to a loop. The action of ∂1 is
given as:
∂1(c) = v2 − v1 + v3 − v2 + v4 − v3 + v1 − v4 = 0
This implies that the null space of ∂1 consists of all closed cycles (chains
without boundaries). And as we saw in Equation 8, the boundaries of k+1-
simplices are closed cycles in Ck, and they belong to ker(∂k). This means that
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ker(∂1) also consists of closed cycles which are boundaries of 2-simplices. But
we know that 2-simplices are homeomorphic to disks or any space without any
holes in them. Therefore, if we remove all the cycles which are boundaries
of 2-simplices, the cycles that remain are those circling a hole. From the
definition of the homology group H1 (C (Rc)) = ker(∂1)/Img(∂2), it is clear
that H1 counts the number of holes in our topological space.We now present
an example to illustrate the basic mechanism of this procedure
V4
V1
V2
V3
e3
e2e1
e4
Figure 5: a chain in ker(∂1)
3.3.1 Example
Consider the simplicial complex X shown in Figure 4(b). The orientation
of the simplices (1 and 2-dimensional) are arbitrarily chosen; the homology
assigned spaces will be independent of this choice. Consider the 1-chains
(paths): c1, the outermost boundary, c2, the closed path enclosing the trian-
gles and c3, the closed path enclosing the hole, all in clockwise orientations.
These chains in terms of the basis vectors (the simplices) are expressed as
c1 = E1− E6 + E12 + E11 + E10 + E9 + E2,
c2 = E1−E6−E7+E8+E9−E2, c3 = E12+E11+E10−E8+E7.
Note that Equation (6) states that a change in the sign of a simplex changes
its orientation. Using Equation (7) for the boundary operator, we can see
that
∂1(c3) = ∂1(E12)+∂1(E11)+∂1(E10)−∂1(E8)+∂1(E7) = V 7−V 6+V 8−
V 7 + V 5− V 8− (V 5− V 4) + V 6− V 4 = 0
Similarly, any closed path (including c1 and c2) can be shown to belong to
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ker(∂1). Again using Equation (7), the action of the ∂2 operator, on T1 for
example, is given as
∂2(T1) = E6 + E5 + E7.
It should be easy to verify that c2 can be expressed as c2 = ∂2(T4−T3+T2−
T1) and therefore, c2 ∈ img(∂2) Note also that c1 − c3 = c2, i.e., c1 and c3
differ by a chain in img(∂2) and are therefore, homologous. In other words,
they encircle the same hole. To compute H1(X), first observe that any closed
path on X may be expressed as a sum of the closed paths surrounding the
four triangles and, that surrounding the hole. Therefore, ker(∂1) is a vector
space with 5 basis vectors, i.e., ker(∂1) ∼= R5. Also, the four closed paths
generated by the action of ∂2 on the four triangles (the basis vectors for C2)
are linearly independent and therefore, img(∂2) ∼= R4. From definition (5)
of a homology space as a quotient space, we can see that H1(X) ∼= R. The
first homology group has one generator, corresponding to one hole in the
complex.
3.3.2 Laplacians
As we saw in the above example, the computation of the dimension of the H1
(the first betti number) involves computing the ranks of the operators ∂1 and
∂2. Such a task is computationally very expensive, and as we will show in
Section 4.2, the precise rank of these operators is not necessary for detecting
the existence of a hole. Laplacian operators provide an easier way to detect
the triviality of the homology spaces. The graph laplacian from graph theory
may be generalized to the case of simplicial complexes [22] as
Definition Given a chain complex C, the kth Laplacian operator Lk : Ck →
Ck is defined as
Lk = ∂k+1 ◦ ∂∗k+1 + ∂∗k ◦ ∂k
where ∂∗k is the adjoint of ∂k
It may be shown [22] that the kernel of the laplacian operator Lk is isomor-
phic to the kth homology group, i.e., ker(Lk) ∼= Hk(C), and we can use the
laplacian operators to infer the topology of Kp (Rc). An important prop-
erty of the Laplacian operators is that they are symmetric and non-negative
definite.
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3.4 Distributed Computation
In this Section, we address issues central to sensor networks, chief among
them the scaling of computation with the network size, and the implemen-
tation of related mathematical tools.
Owing to excessive cost of communication between nodes , gathering all
the raw data at the nodes to a sink node is prohibitive. Whenever possible,
distributive algorithms should be designed to reduce the demand for data col-
lection. The power consumption during communication is in addition higher
relative to that required for computations within the nodes, thus highlight-
ing the importance for algorithms to reduce communication by with-in node
computations. The use of positioning systems such as GPS or other localiza-
tion algorithms, is also very expensive, emphasizing the use of localization
information be avoided if at all possible. The algorithm we propose here
satisfies all these basic requirements.
An interesting class of distributed algorithms is that of gossip algorithms,
where nodes process the data by passing messages amongst their neighbors.
One particular gossip algorithm we exploit extensively, is the distributed
computation of eigenvalues of sparse matrix in a network [18] using the or-
thogonal (or power) iteration method. In particular, as described in Section
4.2, we wish to compute the spectral radius of the first order laplacian L1
of the Rips complex Kp (Rc). We can extract the Rips Complex from the
communication graph, distributively compute L1 and its spectral radius as
described in [24]. We also develop some simple gossip algorithms and prove
their efficacy in the following sections as and when required.
4 Coverage Hole Localization
4.1 Algorithm Overview
In this section, we present a novel method to reduce the problem of locating
a coverage hole in a network into one of detecting a hole using a ”divide and
conquer” mehtod. As seen in the previous section, the problem of detecting
a hole in Rc reduces to checking whether the first homology space of the
chain complex formed from Kp (Rc) is trivial, i.e., if H1 (Kp) ∼= 0, there are
no holes in the space. We subsequently and strategically divide the network
into smaller partitions, and check for the presence of holes in each of these
partitions, and ”drop” the partitions where there are none. As we continue
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this process, the partitions which survive, are the boundaries of the holes.
The crux of this algorithm lies in the process of dividing the network in such
a way so as to preserve the topology, i.e., neither create nor destroy holes.
Table 4.1 presents an overview of this algorithm.
for all partitions with non-trivial homology
\\ Dissection
step 1: Find the diameter nodes.
step 2: Find the boundary nodes and construct the partitions.
\\ Detect holes in each of the above two partitions
for the two partitions constructed
step 3: Compute the Laplacian Matrix L
step 4: Check the rank deficiency of L
repeat.
Table 1: Hole Localization Overview
4.2 Hole Detection
In order to determine the number of holes in Rc, we have to compute the
dimension of ker(L1). If on the other hand, the detection of a hole is only
of interest, we may check whether L1 is rank deficient, or in other words, to
check whether L1 has a zero eigenvalue. To that end, we use the following
theorem:
Theorem 4.1 Let L1 be a symmetric non-negative definite matrix with spec-
trum σ(L1), and spectral radius ρ(L1). Then, L1 is rank deficient if ρ(ρ(L1)I−
L1) = ρ(L1)
Proof Let x be an eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue λ ∈ σ(L1).
Then (ρ(L1)I−L1)x = (ρ(L1)−λ)x. ⇒ x is also an eigenvector of (ρ(L1)I−
L1) and its eigenvalue is ρ(L1)− λ. Furthermore, L1 is non-negative definite
⇒ λ ≥ 0 ⇒ ρ(ρ(L1)I − L1) ≤ ρ(L1) if L1 is of full rank, then λ > 0
⇒ ρ(ρ(L1)I − L1) < ρ(L1).
The spectral radius of L1 can be computed using the power iteration
method by searching for the largest eigenvalue which can be distributively
carried out over the network [18]. The convergence of the power iteration
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method (for eigenvector) is slow when the difference between the largest and
second largest eigenvalue is small, while the eigenvalue itself quickly con-
verges to the true value. A false detection of a hole is possible when the
smallest eigenvalue is very close to zero, but this problem is unlikely to hap-
pen in successive partitions (partitions are explained in the next section).
Each iteration in the power iteration method includes multiplying L1 by a
vector from the previous iteration, and normalizing the resulting vector. The
sum of the squared elements of the vector (for normalization) can also be dis-
tributively computed in the network by a gossip algorithm whose convergence
time is of the order Θ (n log(n)) [3] [2].
4.3 Hole Localization
Each element in the first homology space H1 represents an equivalence class
of homologous closed paths encircling a hole in the coverage space. As such,
Localizing the exact boundary of this hole is in essence a problem of finding
the smallest closed path in an equivalence class. A very direct approach
was proposed in [30], where the authors formulate the localization as an
optimization problem to seek the sparsest chain in the H1 space. Such an
approach is effective at the cost of a very slow convergence, and involves
all the nodes in the network to participate in the optimization. While the
presence of holes in a coverage space is a global property, the boundary of a
hole is constrained to a relatively small part of the network. Any ability to
detect a hole in this region in noway depends on the configuration of nodes in
other parts of the network. We exploit this idea to reformulate the problem
of identifying a boundary of a hole to a much simpler problem of detecting
holes.
We accomplish this reformulation by iteratively dissecting the network into
two smaller partitions, and by detecting the presence of holes in these smaller
partitions. All nodes in the partition where no hole is detected, go into a
“sleep” mode and are taken out of the analysis, yielding a a valuable power
saving. The remaining active nodes will form partitions with non-trivial
homology (with holes in coverage), to get further dissected in pursuit of hole
localization. We will thus be rapidly converging onto the exact boundary of
the holes with each iteration. In the first iteration, each connected component
of the network graph G is treated as a partition. The partitioning strategy
is to minimize the ”size” of the resulting partitions, while simultaneously
preserving the overall topology.
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4.3.1 Finding Diameter Nodes
Firstly, we elaborate on what we mean by “size” in the above description.
The time required to complete steps 1 and 2 above, directly depends on the
diameter of the network partition. Step 4 utilizes a gossip algorithm whose
convergence does depend on the diameter, with other factors possibly coming
into play [4]. A network segmentation obtained by minimizing the diameter
of the smaller partitions is therefore optimal for minimizing the overall run
time. This is facilitated by identifying a pair of nodes called the diameter
nodes defined by
(u¯, v¯) = arg max
(vi,vj)
d (vi, vj) , (9)
where d (vi, vj) is the shortest path between nodes vi and vj (in terms of hop
count) in the partition of interest. Such a pair will generally not be unique,
and “ties” between nodes are broken by a simple protocol which chooses the
pair that has the node with the smallest ID.
We determine the boundary nodes in two stages; We first find the candidate
nodes Cdia by assigning a scalar field f(vi) equal to the farthest distance for
each node x in the current partition, and to ultimately select the nodes with
the maximum f ; we subsequently proceed to break the “ties” using the afore
mentioned criterion,
f(vi) = max
vj
d (vi, vj)
Cdia = {v|f(v) = max
vj
f(vj)}. (10)
To compute f on G, we use a simplified version of the Dijkstra’s algorithm.
The simplification is a result of the following differences with Dijkstra’s, a)we
do not need the shortest paths but rather just the distances and b)Instead
of shortest distance from a node vi to all other nodes, we require max of
distances.
4.3.2 Computing the scalar field f
A summary of the algorithm for computing f is given in Table 4.3.3. In what
follows, we provide an intuition into the mechanics of the algorithm followed
by a mathematical justification.
It immediately follows from Equation (10) that, in order to compute f(x),
it is sufficient for each node vi to have the knowledge of d (vi, vj) for all vj
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in G. Since f(vi) has to be computed for all vi, the preceding statement
may equivalently be stated as; for each vi, it is sufficient for all vj (all other
nodes) to know d (vi, vj). We accomplish this by broadcasting node vi’s id
in the network, and for each node vj, d (vi, vj) is equal to the number of
hops taken by the first message arriving at vj. Note that, in order for vi’s
id to reach all other nodes (assuming a connected Graph), it is sufficient
that any other node broadcasts this information to its neighbors only once,
since re-broadcasting will provide no new information. This will result in
reducing the number of required broadcasts. In order to ensure that no
message (id) is re-broadcast, it is sufficient for each node to remember all the
messages it previously transmitted (for example, by maintaining a table).
The next theorem assuages this requirement by showing that it is sufficient
for a node to remember all the messages only for a limited time. This reduces
the memory requirement on the nodes. We now provide a mathematical
justification for the above intuitive arguments.
Denote as A = {aij}, the adjacency matrix for G, then An = anij, n > 0 where
anij is the number of paths of length n from i to j [15]. For simplicity, we
assume that i is the ID given to node vi. Now, the shortest distance from vi
to vj , i 6= j is given by
d(vi, vj) = argmin
n>0
anij > 0, i 6= j (11)
The matrix An can be distributively represented in the network where node
vi computes and stores the i
th row. This can be iteratively computed as
An+1 = A · An, and an+1ij at node vi is obtained as an+1ij =
∑
vk∈N(vi) a
n
kj .
This computation is enabled by all the nodes broadcasting their row to their
neighbors. If m is the smallest integer such that amij > 0, this implies there
is no path from vi to vj of length smaller than m. Therefore, the node
i “discovers” node j at iteration m and at this instant, is a ”new” node.
Further, if k ∈ N(i), this also implies am+1kj > 0 and the values of ankj for
n > m + 1 are irrelevant from the perspective of computing d (vk, vj). We
therefore refrain from broadcasting amij for n > m time intervals. In other
words, each node broadcasts the information about a new node it discovers
only once. Note that in so doing, we do not actually compute An at the nth
iteration, but an estimate Aˆn with the property that the smallest integer m
for which aˆmij > 0 is that for a
m
ij > 0. The table used, acts as a reference to
avoid transmitting duplicate information to its neighbors. Here, it appears
that the memory required at each node will be equal to the number of nodes
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in the partition, as all the nodes will eventually be discovered. We maintain
that it suffices to store a node in the table for only two iterations.
Theorem 4.2 A node vi storing the information about the node vj for two
iterations, guarantees no duplicate information is broadcasted.
Proof By contradiction.
Duplicate information will be broadcast if a node vi discovers a node vj at
iterations m and m + t, t > 2. This means that there are two paths P =
(j, p1, . . . , pm−1, i) and Q = (j, q1, . . . , qm+t−1, i). At the m
th iteration, node
vi will start a broadcast which propagates along Q in the reverse direction
and meets the message coming along Q at node qm+t1 = qm+t−t1 . ∃t1 =
(t−1)/2 or (t−2)/2, whichever is an integer such that (m+t−t1)−(m+t1) =
1 or 2. The message from vj would take the path Q only if node qm+t1
broadcast it, thus violating the rule because vj is already in the table at that
instant.
If nmax is the largest distance for which a node vi discovers a new node, then
we set f(vi) = nmax.
4.3.3 Diameter nodes
Once f is computed, candidate diameter nodes are found by consensus for
maximizing f on the network by a simple gossip algorithm. There are many
algorithms in the literature for computing such aggregates on the network,
for example [6]. The essence of such algorithms is that at each iteration, if a
node ”discovers” a new max value, it broadcasts this discovered value to all
its neighbors. Similarly, the diameter nodes are obtained from the candidate
nodes by consensus for a minimum of node IDs.
4.3.4 Finding Boundary Nodes
As the physical positions of the nodes do not change, we form a virtual seg-
mentation by finding boundary nodes B = {bi} within a partition which stop
messages from passing through. This effectively separates a given partition
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At each Node i in the segment
\\ Computing f
\\ Initialization: Discover itself
add vi to table and broadcast to N(i)
\\ run time
at iteration n:
\\check for new nodes discovered
if found new nodes
broadcast new nodes to N(i)
add new nodes to table
clear values of n-2 iteration
else
f(vi) = n
stop.
At each Node i in VX
\\Initialization
if vi is a diameter node
broadcast i to N(i). stop.
(i will serve as the segment ID)
else
wait until reception
if received two distinct IDs
broadcast the lowest received ID to N(i).
vi = boundary node.
wait one time interval
if received two distinct IDs overall
vi = boundary node.
stop.
Table 2: Finding Diameter Nodes and Boundary Nodes
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into two parts with non-intercommunicating nodes. For a set B to behave
like a boundary 1, it has to satisfy certain properties:
Definition Let X = (VX , EX) ⊆ G be a connected sub-graph. The set of
nodes B is said to be a boundary in X , if and only if ∃ two disjoint sets
VX1, VX2 ⊂ VX such that there is a node bi ∈ B in any path (vi, . . . , vj),
where vi ∈ X1 and vj ∈ X2. Furthermore, VX1 ∪ VX2 ∪B = VX .
If every path from VX1 to VX2 contains a boundary node, this means there
is no path along which a message from VX1 can reach VX2, thus virtually
separating both. This justifies the above definition for the boundary. The
boundary nodes identify their neighbors as belonging to VX1 or VX2, and do
not transmit messages from one to the other.
To minimize the diameter of the resulting partitions (S1 = VX1 ∪ B and
S2 = VX2 ∪ B), we choose the boundary nodes to be equidistant from the
determined diameter nodes. This will cause the boundary nodes to bisect
the diameter of X . These equidistant nodes are obtained using a simple
flooding algorithm which is presented in Table 4.3.3. The basic idea is to
start a flood from both diameter nodes, and determine the boundary nodes
where these floods meet. Every node will either belong to S1 or to S2 since
X is connected and therefore, S1 ∪S2 = X1 ∪X2 ∪B = X . Let the diameter
points be x1 and x2, and let v1 ∈ X1 and v2 ∈ X2. This implies v1 and
v2 received a single ID, ID(x1) and ID(x2) respectively. It follows that for
any path p = (v1, . . . , v2), ∃vi ∈ p such that vi received both IDs and hence
belong to B. This shows that the nodes obtained as in Table 4.3.3, indeed
satisfy the definition of the boundary.
An additional and very important property that a boundary partitioning
should satisfy, is that it should preserve the topology of the original entity
(see Figure 6). Specifically, if X has no holes in its coverage, then neither
S1 nor S2 should; and if X has a hole, then it should be preserved in ei-
ther one of the partitions. Theorem 4.3 shows that a sufficient condition for
preserving the topology is the contractibility of the Rips complex obtained
from an induced subgraph on the boundary nodes B. The Rips complex for
X is obtained by taking all the cliques as simplices, and similarly for the
1This definition of a boundary should not be confused with the conventional notion,
confounded with the closure of a graph or a region. The particular definition we are using
will be clear from the context.
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Figure 6: The partitioning on the left does not preserve topology whereas
that on the right does.
subgraphs induced on S1, S2 and B.
Theorem 4.3 Let X be a Simplicial complex and A,B ⊂ X be sub complexes
such that A ∩ B forms a boundary on the underlying graph. Then H1(X) =
H1(A)⊕H1(B) if A∩B is contractible, i.e., H0(A∩B) = R and H1(A∩B) =
0.
Proof For any simplicial complex X , and A,B ⊂ X , ∃ the following exact
sequence called the Meyer-Vietoris Exact sequence.
H1(A ∩ B) φ→ H1(A)⊕H1(B) ψ→ H1(X)
where φ and ψ are linear operators. Now,
H1(A ∩ B) = 0 ⇒ img(φ) = 0 ⇒ ker(ψ) = 0 ⇒ ψ is injective since it is
linear. Therefore, H1(A)⊕H1(B) ⊆ H1(X)
Let c ∈ ker(∂1(CX1 )) be a chain in the null space of the first boundary
operator acting on the first chain space of X (c is a closed path), such that
it contains v1 ∈ A and v2 ∈ B. ∃b1, b2 ∈ c, b1 6= b2 such that b1, b2 also
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∈ A ∩ B since A ∩ B is a boundary. (See Figure 7). Now, since A ∩ B
is connected, ∃ a chain corresponding to the path b1 → b2. Consider the
two chains corresponding to closed paths c1 := (v1 → b1 → b2 → v1) and
c2 := (v2 → b2 → b1 → v2). It immediately follows that c1 + c2 = c.
Therefore, any chain in ker(∂1(C
X
1 )) can be expressed as a sum of chains in
ker(∂1(C
A
1 )) and ker(∂1(C
B
1 )), ⇒ H1(X) ⊆ H1(A)⊕H1(B).
⇒ H1(X) = H1(A)⊕H1(B).
Figure 7: Figure illustrating a chain in X can be represented as a sum of
chains in A and B where A,B ⊆ X and A ∩ B is connected
The first part of the theorem states that no new holes are created by
the partitioning, and the second states that all the holes are preserved. If
the boundary nodes obtained by the algorithm given in Table 4.3.3 are not
connected, we can form a tree by joining different connected components
by a shortest path between them. This shortest path can be discovered by
a simple flooding in the network originating at the connected components.
The boundary obtained is also usually contractible, aside from one exception.
As shown in Figure 8, this happens exactly when d(x1, v1) = d(x1, v2) =
d(x2, v3) = d(x2, v4) in the given configuration, where x1 and x2 are the
diameter nodes. In this case, all the nodes v1, v2, v3, v4 will be made boundary
nodes. Note that we use the contractibility condition only to prove that no
new holes are created, which is clearly also valid in this case.
Once we found these boundary nodes, we can proceed and partition the
network into two. We subsequently compute the Laplacian matrix, and check
for rank deficiency as described in Section 4.2.
4.4 Complexity Analysis
Algorithms in sensor networks depend on variety of factors such as inter-node
communication, in-node processing, memory requirements and run time.
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Figure 8: Exception case when B ∋ v1, v2, v3, v4 is not contractible
These carry different costs depending on the context, and the communi-
cation cost is almost always dominant. We conduct a complexity analysis
accounting for these pertinent points. The complexity also depends on the
spatial arrangement of the nodes. For simplicity, we assume that the re-
gion of deployment is convex. We also focus on an average cost per node
rather than the cost of the entire network. Most of the complexity of the
detection/localization algorithm (and therefore the bottlenecks) depends on
three factors 1) Evaluating the function f , 2) Finding max(f) and 3) Find-
ing spectral radius of the Laplacian. Furthermore, since each iteration of the
partitioning procedure sees half of the surviving nodes removed, the average
cost per node primarily depends on the first iteration.
4.4.1 Communications
For evaluating f , each node discovers every other node at some point and
broadcasts the information to its neighbors. Each node broadcasts the dis-
covery precisely once for every other node. As a result, the complexity per
node for evaluating f is o(n), where n is the number of nodes. Evaluating
the complexity for determining max(f) is rather peculiar since the behavior
of the node depends on value of f at that node. Recall from Section 4.3.3
titled “Diameter nodes”, that if a node with a function value higher than
any previously recorded value is encountered, this information is broadcast.
The nodes with the highest value of f for example, never broadcast anything
during this part of the algorithm. In order to evaluate the complexity in this
case, we consider a simple case where nodes are deployed in a circular region.
The radius of this circle will be ρ ∝ √n. In this case, the nodes which lie on
the circle of radius r, (see Figure 9) will broadcast the discovery of exactly
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Figure 9: Figure illustrating the simple case for assessing complexity
ρ− r nodes which have a higher f value than previously recorded.
The number of broadcasts over the entire network would end up as
b = 2pi
ρ∑
i=1
i (ρ− i) = ρ
2 (ρ+ 1)
2
−ρ (ρ+ 1) (2ρ+ 1)
6
=
ρ (ρ− 1) (ρ+ 1)
6
∝ ρ3 ∝ n3/2.
The average complexity per node for evaluating max(f) is therefore o (
√
n).
Figure 10(a) shows a log− log relation between the number of nodes n and
the number of memory words broadcast for finding the diameter nodes in the
first partition. For each value of n, we averaged over 5 networks. A linear re-
gression (line in blue) shows a slope of 0.9 ≈ 1 confirming the dominant effect
of evaluating f at o(n) cost. The complexity for finding the spectral radius
of L1 will be proportional to the mean degree of the nodes (as the number of
values broadcast in the power iteration method will be proportional to the
number of neighbors) and depend logarithmically on the ratio α1/α2 where
α1 and α2 are the first and second largest Eigen values. The difficulty of
apriorily estimating these Eigen values for a random matrix, will complicate
this ratio as an explicit function of n. We therefore provide some numerical
results shown in Figure 10(b). This figure compares the total number of
memory words broadcast for detecting a hole (evaluating spectral radius of
L1 and αI − L1) in our algorithm, with those required for localizing a hole
by an l1 norm minimization as presented in [30].
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Figure 10: Complexity analysis for (a)finding diameter nodes (b)localizing
holes. (b) compares the ’divide and conquer’ method with l1 optimization
in [30]
4.4.2 Memory
The only bottle neck in our algorithm for memory requirement lies in esti-
mating the diameter points of the partition. At the ith time step during this
process, a node discovers all the other nodes in the partition which are at a i−
hop distance. The node keeps this information for 2 time steps, and deletes
it. The iso-distance paths on the network from any node are on the order of
o (
√
n), translating this into the memory requirement for the algorithm.
4.4.3 Run Time
First, note that the number of partitions required to converge on to a hole is
related to the number of nodes as o (log(n)). The time required for finding
both the diameter nodes and the boundary nodes is directly proportional
to the diameter of the network, i.e., o (
√
n). The number of iterations re-
quired for the power iteration method (for computing spectral radius of the
Laplander) to converge, similar to its communication cost, is of the order
o (log (α1/α2)). In each iteration of the power method, finding the sum (for
normalizing) requires Θ (n log(n)) time [3] [2].
4.5 Simulation Examples
Figure 11 shows the algorithm on a random network with 50 nodes. Figure
11(a) shows the communication graph superimposed on the coverage area.
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In the first partition, the boundary nodes are indicated by the red circles
and the diameter nodes are indicated in black. The boundary nodes dictate
where the partition occurs and as shown in Figure 11(b), all the nodes in the
partition which do not enclose a hole are no longer considered. An important
point is that as the algorithm progresses, additional nodes are put to rest
saving valuable power. IN the end, only the cycle closest to the coverage hole
survives, providing a good indication of where the failure took place.
5 Worm Hole Problem
A worm hole attack is launched by two colluding external attackers which
do not authenticate themselves as legitimate nodes to the network. When
starting a wormhole attack, one attacker overhears packets at one point in
the network, tunnels these packets through the wormhole link (external to
the network) to another point in the network. This generates a false scenario
that the original sender is in the neighborhood of the remote location. An
example of a worm-hole attack is shown in Figure ??. In this Section, our aim
is to first show the methodology of detecting, if such an attack is taking place,
and if so, to locate the attack positions. By way of a simple observation, we
show that the algorithm to find a coverage hole, may be extended to address
this problem.
5.1 Worm Hole Detection
Because a worm hole links geographically separated positions in the network,
it essentially creates a cycle in the network which cannot be a boundary of
a 2-simplex. It thus creates a non-zero homology component. Figure 12(b)
shows a network with a worm hole link, and the resulting deformation of the
network structure which yields a cycle. We have already seen in Section 4
how to localize this cycle. It is hence clear that a presence of a worm-hole
in the network, would be followed by a localization of the shortest cycle it
creates.
The problem now reduces to identifying this cycle as a coverage hole or
a wormhole. To this end, we formulate a simple algorithm shown in Table
5.1. The central idea of our approach is based on the observation that a
cycle surrounding a coverage hole lies on the surface in which the network is
deployed, while a cycle created by a worm hole will not lie in this surface.
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(a) Communication Graph
superimposed on the cover-
age area
(b) after partition 1 (c) after partition 2
(d) after partition 3 (e) after partition 4 (f) after partition 5
(g) after partition 6 (h) after partition 7
Figure 11: Figure showing the sequence of surviving supgraph with each
partition
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Original Grid with the worm hole
(a) network grid with links caused because of
a worm-hole
(b) the same grid shown in 3d to respect dis-
tant properties measured as hop distances
Figure 12: Deformation in network structure because of a worm hole. The
cycle created is shown in red
Removing a cycle which surrounds a coverage hole will therefore divide the
network into two components, while removing a cycle created by a worm-hole
does not. Figure 13 demonstrates this case. The network grid in Figure 13(a)
shows a coverage hole and the shortest cycle surrounding it. This cycle is
grown homologously, i.e., without creating any more loops or destroying any,
in the network as shown in Figure 13(b). When the nodes on this cycle along
with their neighbors are removed from the network, the resulting network
consists of two connected components as shown in Figure 13(c). Figures
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(a) Cycle surround-
ing a coverage hole
(b) A cycle grown
in the network
(c) Grown cycle re-
moved
(d) Cycle created by the
wormhole
(e) The cycle grown in the
network
(f) The grown cycle removed
Figure 13: The structural difference between the cycles created by a coverage
hole and by a worm hole
13(d), 13(e) and 13(f) show the same processes for a cycle created by a
worm hole. As seen in 13(f), the resulting network is still a single connected
component. The two steps 1) Growing the cycle and 2) removing the nodes
along with their neighbors, are explained in detail in the following sections.
Grow the current cycle to get a longer homologous cycle in the network.
Remove the longer cycle along with its neighbors.
if The above process creates an isolated component,
The cycle corresponds to a coverage hole.
else
The cycle corresponds to a worm hole.
Table 3: Algorithm for Detecting Worm Holes
5.1.1 Growing the Cycles
The algorithm described in Section 4 yields the shortest (in sense of hop-
distance) non-contractible cycle which, in case of a coverage hole, leads to
33
the boundary. Such a boundary will not serve our purpose, as removing a
boundary will not partition the network into two. We hence have to grow
this cycle ”into” the network. The important properties which we have to
abide by in the course of this cycle growth are
• We should not break a cycle at any time
• We should not introduce any additional loops into the cycle.
A cycle which was originally surrounding a coverage hole will not do so after
it is broken. If we further introduce loops into the cycle during the growing
procedure, a cycle due to a worm hole will now be similar to that surround-
ing a coverage hole. The above two properties are precisely captured by the
idea of homologous chains. Two chains which belong to the same equivalence
class in the homology space, are said to be homologous. Recall from Section
3.3, the definition of homology groups as Hk(C∗) = ker(∂k)/Img(∂k+1). If
c1, c2 ∈ ker (∂1) belong to the same equivalent class, then c1 − c2 ∈ Img(∂2),
i.e., their difference can be written as sum of the boundaries of 2-simplices
(triangles). To that end, we ”homologously” grow the cycle by applying two
elementary steps, both of which add a boundary of a 2-simplex to the exist-
ing chain.
Elementary Step 1 If two adjacent nodes v1, v2 in the chain share a com-
mon neighbor v3, we then remove the edge (v1, v2) from the chain, and add
the edges (v1, v3) and (v3, v2). This step is shown in Figure 14.
Figure 14: (a)before, (b)after Elementary Step 1, and (c)the difference of
the chains before and after the step. Note that (c), which is c1 − c2, is a
boundary of a 2-simplex. The edges shown in red are part of the chain.
Elementary Step 2 If a node v1 on the chain has two neighbors v2, v3 which
are also on this chain, and v2, v3 are neighbors, we then remove the edges
(v2, v1), (v1, v3) and we add the edge (v2, v3). This step is shown in Figure
15
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Figure 15: (a)before, (b)after Elementary Step 2, and (c)the difference of
the chains before and after the step. Note that (c), which is c1 − c2, is a
boundary of a 2-simplex. The edges shown in red are part of the chain.
Figure 16: An edge (not in the cycle) ”crosses” one on the cycle. In this
case, removing just the nodes on the cycle would not separate the network
into two components.
5.1.2 Removing the cycle
We saw in Figure 13 that removing the nodes on a cycle surrounding a cov-
erage hole, along with their neighbors, yields two disconnected components.
The reason for the insufficiency of removing just the nodes on the cycle, is
that there might be two adjacent nodes in the graph whose edge ”crosses”
an edge on this cycle as shown in Figure 16. However, it can be shown that
removing the nodes on a cycle along with their neighbors, will result in the
required separation [26].
Note that until this point, we have made no assumption about the density
of the nodes in the network. We can successfully identify whether the shortest
non-contractible cycle identified in Section 4 corresponds to a coverage hole
or a worm hole, i.e., we have detected if there is a worm hole in the network.
We have thus far restricted the location of a worm hole attack to a relatively
small subgraph of the network (the shortest cycle). In the following section,
we present an effective approach to precisely locate the worm hole in question.
5.2 Worm Hole Localization
In order to precisely locate a worm hole, we first closely examine its impact.
Denote the colluding nodes in the attack as X and Y (Figure ??). As a
result of this attack, a node in the vicinity of X considers all the nodes in
the vicinity of Y as its neighbors. This also results in the formation of a
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Edge removal on interior nodes gives rise to alternative shortest path
(a) v1, v2 not in vicinity of X and Y . A shortest path
can be found in the network surrounding the nodes re-
moved.
Removal of Worm Holes
X
Y
(b) v1, v2 in vicinity of X and Y . Alternative shortest
path includes all the nodes in the cycle
Figure 17: Worm Hole Localization
cycle. Observe that a simple way to undo the effect of a worm hole is to
remove all the nodes in the vicinity of X and Y . Note that the algorithm
in Section 4 finds the shortest cycle, implying that there will exactly be two
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Why Edge Removal will fail
X
Y
Figure 18: A sparse network where the algorithm fails. The removal of nodes
around v1 and v2 creates an isolated component in the network.
nodes on this cycle which are in the vicinity of X or Y . In this light, we
propose a simple algorithm given in Table 5.2 to localize the worm hole.
for each adjacent pair v1, v2 in the cycle
Remove the edge (v1, v2) and all neighbors of v1 and v2
except those on the cycle.
Find the shortest path between v1 and v2.
if This shortest path coincides with the nodes on the cycle
v1 and v2 are in the vicinity of X and Y .
Table 4: Algorithm for Localizing Worm Holes
If v1, v2 were indeed in the vicinity of X and Y , then removing all their
neighbors would remove all the spurious links caused by the worm hole. In
this case, the shortest path between v1 and v2 would be the rest of the cycle.
If on the other hand, they were not in the vicinity of X or Y , then they
would find an alternative path in the network which surrounds the deleted
nodes. The result of this algorithm is shown in Figure 17.
We note that this algorithm assumes a minimal node density to properly
perform. It should however be noted that the algorithm is most effective
when the network is sufficiently dense. When the network is sparse, the
removal of neighbors of v1 and v2 may eliminate all possible paths between
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them, at the exception of those going through the links created by the worm
hole. For example, in Figure 18, since the network is very sparse, the removal
of neighbors of v1 and v2 creates an isolated component, which is only linked
by the worm hole. Any path will therefore have to go through one of the
links created by the worm hole.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we addressed using two specific problems; 1) Coverage Hole
Localization and 2) An extended application to Worm Hole attack Localiza-
tion. We have shown that topological analysis of a network provides us with
substantial and ample information to assess its health, and requires minimal
prior information. To that end, we have proposed an Algebraic Topological
approach as an elegant and efficient avenue for extracting useful information.
The formulation into an algebraic domain enables us to utilize extensive ex-
isting tools to effectively address these problems. We have also, by way of the
computational efficiency of our proposed approach, addressed a very crucial
problem in sensor networks, namely that of prolonging the battery life of the
nodes.
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